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EXEMPTION OF VEMTEANS' BENEFITS
charity"' 5 or if furnishing the residence was necessary to the performance
of the owning institution's charitable functions.' The meaning of the
word "necessary" in this connection has varied somewhat with the par-
ticular factual situation. In the case of hospital-owned residences, before
they will be considered necessary, the hospital apparently must not be
able to carry out its charitable functions without providing them,..
while in the case of a Y.M.C.A.-type organization, the residence need
only be incidental to the charitable functions of the owning institution in
order to be declared exempt'
ROBERT A. LENGA
Exemption of Veterans' Benefits
Section 3101 (a) of the Veterans' Benefits Act provides protection for
payments made under any law administered by the Veterans' Administra-
tion. The purpose of this legislation is to provide the veteran with at least
one source of income upon which he can rely for his support and mainte-
nance.' However, this protection is lost should the veteran invest these
payments in profit-making enterprises. Further, section 3101 (a) will
not prevent certain types of claimants from satisfying their claims from
the exempt assets. This article studies: (1) the types of investments
which will cause the loss of section 3101 (a) protection, and (2) the
types of claimants who are not barred by section 3101 (a). Further, the
effect of a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Porter v. Aetna
Gas. & Sur. Co.,2 upon this area of the law will be analyzed.
PROTECTION OF BENEFITS PAID BY THE
VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION
Federal Law
Payments of benefits by the Veterans' Administration are not assign-
able by the veteran, are exempted from taxation, and cannot be levied
upon, attached, or seized by creditors.3 Protection extends before and
after receipt of payments paid "to, or on account of, a beneficiary."' ,
105. See Beerman Foundation, Inc. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 152 Ohio St. 179, 182, 87
N.E.2d 474, 476 (1949); Cleveland Branch of Guild of St. Barnabas for Nurses v. Board of
Tax Appeals, 150 Ohio St. 484,486-87, 83 N.E.2d 229, 230-31 (1948).
106. See, e.g., Western Reserve Academy v. Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 133, 139-40,
91 N.E.2d 497, 500-01 (1950) (dissenting opinion); Aulman Hosp. Ass'n v. Evatt, 140
Ohio St. 114, 117, 42 NE.2d 646, 647 (1940).
107. See Doctors Hosp. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 173 Ohio St. 283, 288, 181 N.E.2d 702,
705 (1962) (concurring opinion); Aultman Hosp. Ass'n v. Evatt, 140 Ohio St. 114, 117, 42
N.E,2d 646, 647 (1942).
108. Goldman v. Friars Club, Inc., 158 Ohio St. 185, 199, 107 NE.2d 518, 524 (1952).
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However, this protection ceases when the funds are permanently invested
or have lost the quality of money.' The exemption provision, then, as-
sures the veteran the use and enjoyment of benefits provided for his sup-
port and maintenance.6
While the Supreme Court has upheld the exemption of veterans'
benefits deposited in a bank, with or without interest,7 it has also indicated
that benefit funds invested in land, stocks, bonds, and merchandise are not
protected! It has done so in cases dealing with taxation as well as in
those concerning other claims barred by section 3101 (a).'
A rule of thumb appears to be that when the veterans' benefits are
diverted from their primary purpose, that of maintenance and support,
to a business or profit-making use, the exemption ends. Safekeeping, as
opposed to permanent investment, is the only protected use of the bene-
fit funds.
1. 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1959) [hereinafter cited as § 3101 (a)). (Throughout this article the
term "veteran" is used to mean any beneficiary of funds paid by the Veterans' Administration
and protected by section 3101 (a).)
2. 370 U.S. 159 (1962).
3. Section 3101 is, in pertinent part, as follows: "(a) Payments of benefits due or to become
due under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration shall not be assignable ...
and such payments made to, or on account of, a beneficiary shall be exempt from taxation,
shall be exempt from the claims of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or
seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by
the beneficiary. The preceding sentence shall not apply to claims of the United States arising
under such laws nor shall the exemption therein contained as to taxation extend to any property
purchased in part or wholly out of such payments .. " Subsection (c) reserves to the federal
government the right to collect taxes due by seizure of these "protected" funds. Subsection
(b) deals with the prohibitions against collection by set-off from veterans' benefits.
4. Ibid. See In re Beall's Estate, 384 Pa. 14, 19-20, 119 A.2d 216, 219 (1956). The Act
of August 12, 1935, c. 510, 49 Stat. 607, extended the exemption to cover the payments
before and after receipt. This was to counteract the effect of McIntosh v. Aubrey, 185 U.S.
122 (1902), which held that only payments "due or to become due" were exempt.
5. Carrier v. Bryant, 306 U.S. 545 (1939); Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 (1933).
Permanent investment indicates a conversion into property or a launching upon speculative
or business ventures. Trotter v. Tennessee, supra.
6. Carrier v. Bryant, 306 U.S. 545 (1939); Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 (1937); Trotter
v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 (1933).
7. Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159 (1962); Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245
(1937).
8. Carrier v. Bryant, 306 U.S. 545 (1939); Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 (1933).
Accord, McCurry v. Peck, 54 Ga. App. 341, 187 S.E. 854 (1936) (land); Liles v. H. K.
Mulford Co., 52 Ga. App. 674, 184 S.E. 396 (1936) (automobile). But see, Elbert Sales Co.
v. Granite City Bank, 55 Ga. App. 836, 192 S.E. 66 (1937) (bank account); Spicer v. Smith,
288 U.S. 430 (1933) (no priority given to exempt bank account on bank's insolvency). Cf.
Guardianship of Pryor, 106 N.E.2d 672 (Ohio C.P. 1952) (equity maxim used to permit
recovery). See generally SHIPLEY, AMERICAN LAW OF VETERANs §§ 41-49 (2d ed. 1954).
9. Compare Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 (1933), with Carrier v. Bryant, 306 U.S.
545 (1939). Compare Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 (1937), with Porter v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159 (1962).
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Additional Protection Under State Law
Many states have general exemption acts protecting, for example,
specified personal property and homesteads."0 Since these assets are free
from seizure by creditors, veterans' benefits invested therein thus receive
protection supplemental to that afforded by section 3101 (a). In ad-
dition to general statutes, some states specifically safeguard those assets
of the veteran which may no longer be exempted under the federal act."
Veterans' pensions, for example, often receive state protection over and
above that provided by section 3101(a).*2 While the federal exemp-
tion ends upon the investment of pension payments, the laws of three
states'3 afford additional protection for the pension funds when they are
loaned, deposited, or invested.' Other states provide protection for vary-
ing periods of time. Illinois and Minnesota exempt benefits from credi-
tors' claims for one year,'" whereas the period in Kansas 6 is only three
months. Nebraska, 7 on the other hand, has no time limitations but does
impose a monetary limit of $2,000, encompassing not only the pension,
but also any profits from its use.
The theory behind state exemption statutes is similar to that of sec-
tion 3101(a). Public policy requires the preservation of at least one
source of income upon which the veteran and his family may rely for
sustenance and support. 8 However, since the state exemption statutes
are so varied and often provide incomplete protection, section 3101 (a)
remains the basic guarantor of veterans' benefits' protection.
10. 22 AM. JuRL Exemptions §§ 33-102 (1939).
11. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.9 (1950); LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 19-480
(1952); WAsH. REv. CODE § 6.16.040 (1961). See also SHIPLEY, AMERiCAN LAW OF VET-
ERANS (app., 2d ed. 1954).
12. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC CODE § 690.22, which is, in pertinent part, as follows: "All
money received by any person, a resident of the State, as a pension... from the United States
Government... whether the same shall be in the actual possession of such pensioner or bene-
ficiary, or deposited, loaned or invested by him, is exempt from execution or attachment."
13. CAL. Civ. PRoc CODE S 690.22; IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.8 (1950); N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
ACT § 667. Interpretation of the New York act, not its language, renders it similar to the
California and Iowa statutes. See, Yates County Nael Bank v. Carpenter, 119 N.Y. 550, 554,
23 N.E. 1108-09 (1890). The New York act remains the same in the new N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
ACT § 5205 (f), which becomes effective on September 1, 1963.
14. The following statutes exempt funds in the veteran's possession, loaned, or deposited:
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-13-2(1) (i) (Supp. 1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 13
Smith-Hurd 1951); WAsH. REv. CODE § 6.16.030 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 272.18
(1958). For general protection, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-352 (1960); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 31 § 7 (1955); ORE. REV. STAT. § 23.170 (1960).
15. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 13 (Smith-Hurd 1951); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.38
(1949). Illinois provides a penalty of double damages for wrongful seizure of exempt funds.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1951).
16. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3508 (1949). To gain the benefit of this statute, one
must show a need for the funds to support the family receiving them.
17. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1559 (1956). See Dargan v. Williams, 66 Neb. 1, 4, 91 N.W.
862, 863 (1902).
18. Andrew v. Colorado Say. Bank 205 Iowa 872, 874-75, 219 N.W. 62, 64 (1928).
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CLAIMS NOT BARRED BY SECTION 3101 (a)
Alimony and Support Obligations
The language of section 3101 (a) does not make a distinction be-
tween classes of creditors. However, it has been held that those whose
claims rest upon the veteran's duty to support and maintain his family
may recover from exempt assets.'0
The following grounds are often used by courts to permit these types
of claimants to reach protected funds: (1) such claims do not emanate
from a business or profit-motivated relationship; 20 (2) the veteran's obli-
gation does not arise from a mere debt or reparation for civil injury, but
from the fundamental moral, social, and legal duty to support one's
spouse and children;2' (3) this type of claimant has always been afforded
special treatment because of his unique social position;2 2 and (4) Con-
gress intended not only to support the veteran, but also to "afford some
degree of security to the family and dependents of such recipient. ' 23  Ali-
mony and support claimants are therefore considered beneficiaries of sec-
tion 3101 (a) protection.
Congress prevented any anticipated divestment or depletion of vet-
erans' allowances to assure support for the veteran and those for whom
he must provide. 4 A dependent, therefore, may reach funds only when
a duty or obligation exists on the part of the veteran, aside from any pur-
ported assignment of benefits. 5 As a result, a judicial award which is
merely a determination of the manner in which a spouse shall fulfill his
public and marital duty may be satisfied from benefit funds.2" But such
19. See, e.g., In re Flanagan, 31 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1940); Gaskins v. Security-First Nat'l
Bank, 30 Cal. App. 2d 409, 86 P.2d 681 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939); In re Bagnall, 238 Iowa
905, 29 N.W.2d 597 (1947); Dillard v. Dillard, 341 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
See generally SHIPLEY, AMERICAN LAW OF VETERANS §§ 48-49 (2d ed. 1954). See also
Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 1422 (1957).
20. See Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 659-60 (1950).
21. See, e.g., In re Flanagan, 31 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1940); Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112
F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Gaskins v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 30 Cal. App. 2d 409, 86
P.2d 681 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939).
22. Equity courts, for example, have traditionally compelled the satisfaction of alimony and
support obligations by imprisonment. Dillard v. Dillard, 341 S.W.2d 668, 675 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961). Further, such claimants have been accorded a special position in the field of
spendthrift trusts. 2 ScoTT, TRUsTs § 157.1 (2d ed. 1956). Analogy to the ability of de-
pendents to reach the beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust is used in several exemption
cases. See, e.g., Voelkel v. Tohulka, 236 Ind. 588, 593, 141 N.E.2d 344, 345 (1957); In the
Matter of Dugan, 29 Misc. 2d 980, 982, 222 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (Surr. Ct. 1961); Brusbard's
Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C. 107, 112-13 (Pa. C.P. 1938).
23. In re Flanagan, 31 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D.D.C. 1940). See Act of August 12, 1935, c.
510, 49 Star. 607; S. REP. No. 1072, 74th Cong. 1st sess. (1935).
24. Yake v. Yake, 170 Md. 75, 183 Atl. 555 (1936).
25. Ibid. See also Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112
F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Sehrt v. Sehrt, 179 Cal. App. 2d 167, (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
Cf. Stone v. Stone, 188 Ark. 622, 67 S.W.2d 189 (1934) (dower).
26. In re Flanagan, 31 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D.D.C. 1940).
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is not the case if the alimony award is a property settlement, for then it
is basically an assignment.27 Thus, only the dependent's right to be sup-
ported sustains his status as a non-creditor.
Claims for Care in State Institutions
A state welfare department, which furnishes a veteran's necessities,
may be compensated for such care from funds protected by section
3101 (a). 8
Courts have stressed the involuntary nature of this basically non-con-
tractual service - the state's actions being compelled by law. 9 If the
veteran has a guardian, that fiduciary is required to contract for his ward's
support," and therefore, some courts have implied a contract by the
guardian to reimburse the state for assuming this function. 1
The state may not reach protected assets if its claim accrued prior
to the appointment of the veteran's fiduciary."2 This position has been
justified as necessary to avoid endangering present support. 3 In addition,
the satisfaction of any past debt seems contrary to the language and in-
terpretation of section 3101 (a) ." Further, no real inequity arises from
this distinction because the state could have petitioned for a fiduciary's
appointment." Thus, the state's claim for necessities furnished to a
27. Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Sehrt v. Sehrt, 179 Cal. App. 2d
167 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Yake v. Yake, 170 Md. 75, 183 Ad. 555 (1936).
28. See, e.g., Department of Pub. Welfare v. Sevick, 18 IIl. 2d 449, 164 N.E.2d 10 (1960);
In re Lewis' Estate, 287 Mich. 179, 283 N.W. 21 (1938); In re Bemowski's Guardianship,
3 Wis. 2d 133, 88 N.W.2d 22 (1958). Cf., State v. Wendt, 94 Ohio App. 440, 116 N.E.2d
30 (1953); Chojnacdi's Estate, 397 Pa. 596, 156 A.2d 812 (1959). See generally Opinion
of Attorney General of California, No. 47/120 (July 7th, 1947).
29. Ibid.
30. In re Guardianship of Giambastiani, 1 Cal. App. 2d 639, 37 P.2d 142 (Dist. Ct. App.
1934).
31. In re Bayly's Estate, 95 Cal. App. 2d 174, 178, 212 P.2d 587, 590-91 (Dist. Ct. App.
1949); In re Murphy's Committee, 134 Misc. 683, 236 N.Y.S. 343, modified, 227 App. Div.
839, 237 N.Y.S. 448 (Sup. Ct. 1929); In the Matter of Dugan, 29 Misc. 2d 980, 983, 222
N.Y.S.2d 831, 833-34 (Surr. Ct 1961); In re Bemowski's Guardianship, 3 Wis. 2d 133,
147-48, 88 N.W.2d 22, 29-30 (1958).
32. See, e.g., Savoid v. District of Columbia, 288 F.2d 851 (D.C. Cir. 1961); In re Ferar-
azza's Estate, 219 Cal. 668, 28 P.2d 670 (1934); In re Murphy's Committee, 227 App. Div.
839, 237 N.Y.S. 448 (Sup. Ct. 1929); Rothenberger Estate, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 383 (Pa. C.P.
1958); In re Bemowski's Guardianship, 3 Wis. 2d 122, 88 N.W.2d 22 (1958). See also
In re Bayly's Estate, 95 Cal. App. 2d 174, 212 P.2d 587 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (amount of
funds does not affect result.).
33. See In the Matter of Dugan, 29 Misc. 2d 980, 222 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Surt Ct. 1961); In
the Matter of Harp, 25 Misc. 2d 620, 208 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Surr. Ct. 1960).
34. See, e.g., In re Ferarazza's Estate 219 Cal. 668, 28 P.2d 670 (1934); In re Bayly's Estate,
95 Cal. App. 2d 174, 212 P.2d 587 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949); In the Matter of Dugan, 29 Misc.
2d 980, 222 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Surr. Ct. 1961); Brusbard's Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C. 107, 112-13
(Pa. C.P. 1938); Chojnacki's Estate No. 1, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 152 (Orphans' Ct. 1958).
35. In re Bayly's Estate, 95 Cal. App. 2d 174, 178, 212 P.2d 587, 590 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949);
Chojnacki's Estate No. 1, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 152, 157 (Orphans' Ct. 1958). See also In the
Matter of Harp, 25 Misc. 2d 620, 208 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Surr. Ct. 1960).
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veteran is honored only if the obligation accrues after the appointment
of a guardian.
Claims of Suppliers of Necessities
Veterans' allowances are paid free from existing creditors' claims.
Neither debts stemming from credit voluntarily extended nor those aris-
ing from civil injury may be satisfied from exempt assets.36 However,
some claimants are not considered "creditors" for purposes of the federal
act. A dependent whose claims stem from his right to be supported by
the veteran is permitted to reach the benefit funds.3 The state, too, can
satisfy its involuntary claims for necessities furnished subsequent to the
appointment of a fiduciary. 8 An incompetent veteran's guardian must
contract for his ward's necessities, and claims arising in this manner are
honored. " Further, the competent veteran is permitted to spend his al-
lowance for support and maintenance. ° Query: Should a merchant who
supplies necessities to a veteran be allowed to satisfy his claims from the
statutorily protected payments?
In the day to day supplying of necessities, credit is often extended by
the supplier to the competent veteran. Debts of this nature could not
be satisfied out of benefit funds to be paid in the future. 1 But what of
payments already received? Surely these benefits should be available to
the supplier-creditor in spite of the voluntarily incurred creditor-debtor
relationship. Here, no one is jeopardizing current support and main-
tenance." In fact, the merchant is fulfilling the congressional purpose by
providing for the veteran's basic needs. Thus, these present claims should
be honored.43 Any other result either compels the veteran to deal on a
cash basis or prohibits altogether the use of the benefit funds for support
and maintenance.
36. Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Dillard v. Dillard, 341 S.W.2d
668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
37. See notes 19 & 27 supra and accompanying text.
38. See notes 28 & 35 supra and accompanying text.
39. See In re Guardianship of Giambastiani, 1 Cal. App. 2d 639, 37 P.2d 142 (Dist. Ct. App.
1934); In the Matter of Dugan, 29 Misc. 2d 980, 983, 222 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833-34 (Surf. Ct.
1961).
40. In the Matter of Dugan, 29 Misc. 2d 980, 983, 222 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833-34 (Surr. Cc.
1961).
41. In re Bayly's Estate, 95 Cal. App. 2d 174, 178, 212 P.2d 558, 590-91 (Dist. Ct. App.
1949); In the Matter of Harp, 25 Misc. 2d 620, 625, 208 N.Y.S.2d 374, 379 (Surr. Ct. 1960);
Chojnacki's Estate No. 1, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 152, 157 (Orphans' Ct. 1958).
42. See notes 39 & 40 supra and accompanying text. See also 2 ScoTT, TRusTs § 157.2
(2d ed. 1956). Cf. Earl v. Reynolds, 49 Ga. App. 510, 176 S.E. 91 (1934) (support credi-
tor barred from exempt funds because of past debt); Dillard v. Dillard, 241 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961).
43. In the Matter of Dugan, 29 Misc. 2d 980, 983, 222 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833-34 (Surr. Ct.
1961); In re Bemowski's Guardianship, 3 Wis. 2d 133, 147-48, 88 N.W.2d 22, 29-30 (1958).
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Once the current needs of the veteran are satisfied, can any remaining
funds be used to pay past claims for necessities furnished? Must an ex-
cess over present needs be reserved solely for the future? No court has
permitted these past claims to be satisfied from the veteran's allowances.44
Congress appears to have exempted the benefits from existing claims
to prevent the jeopardization of the veteran's support,45 but here present
needs have been satisfied. When weighing past claims for necessities
furnished to the veteran against his future needs, a court would probably
follow the language and existing interpretation of section 3101 (a), con-
serving the veteran's funds for the future.46 A need, therefore, exists for
congressional clarification as to when the supplier of necessities is a
barred creditor under section 3101 (a).
PORTER V. AETNA CAs. & SUR. Co.47
The Supreme Court in the Porter decision was presented with the
problem of determining whether veterans' benefits deposited in a build-
ing and loan association savings account retained the protection afforded
by section 3101(a). The opinion did not, however, affect the question
of what type of claimant may reach benefit payments to satisfy his claims
against the veteran.
History of the Case
The claim of Aetna Casualty and Surety Company against Porter, a
veteran, stems from its defense and settlement of a wrongful death action
in which Porter and his employer, the insured, were defendants." Hav-
ing reduced its claim for indemnity to a judgment against Porter, who
was primarily liable for the death, the insurance company attached two
savings accounts and a checking deposit, both funded with exempt dis-
ability compensation payments. 9
The district court granted a motion to quash the attachment on the
ground that the federal exemption continued to protect the funds de-
posited in the two types of institutions. The decision hinged on the
court's determination that: (1) the deposits did not constitute permanent
44. See, e.g., I re Bayly's Estate, 95 Cal. App. 2d 174, 178, 212 P.2d 587, 591 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1949); Earl v. Reynolds, 49 Ga. App. 510, 176 S.E. 91, 92 (1934); In the Matter of
Harp, 25 Misc. 2d 620, 625, 208 N.Y.S.2d 374, 379 (Surr. Ct. 1960); Chojnacki's Estate No.
1, 13 Pa. D. & C. 152, 157, (Orphans' Ct. 1958). See also Annot., 109 A.L.R. 433 (1937).
45. In re Bayly's Estate, 95 Cal. App. 2d 174, 178, 212 P.2d 587, 590-91 (Dist. Cr. App.
1949); In the Matter of Dugan, 29 Misc. 2d 980, 983, 222 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (Surr. Ct.
1961); Brusbard's Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C. 107, 113 (Pa. C.P. 1938).
46. See notes 36 & 40 supra and accompanying text.
47. 370 U.S. 159 (1962).
48. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Porter, 296 F.2d 389, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
49. Ibid.
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investments, there being no conversion into property, and (2) the bene-
fits did not lose the quality of money."
The appellate court reversed the district court, holding that the sav-
ings accounts were not merely the "uninvested balance of governmental
payments in a bank."'" This result was reached, in part, because the use
of the accounts was motivated by a desire to receive the high interest rate
of building and loan associations. The court also emphasized that, in
law, the owner of the accounts, a voting member in the association, was
regarded as a shareholder. In addition, the depositor could be required
to give thirty-day notice of any intended withdrawals." For these rea-
sons the deposits were held to be permanently invested, and hence not
exempt from Aetna's claim.
The United States Supreme Court brushed aside the technicalities
which obscured the basic nature of the benefit funds.53 Because of the
varying practices and procedures of the federal savings and loan institu-
tions, the Court examined the findings of the trial court to ascertain
whether the deposits in question were permanent investments. "4 The
following factors were determinative of the issue: (1) building and loan
associations are commonly used for safekeeping in the community;
(2) the benefits, as deposited, were easily withdrawn, a formal demand
being unnecessary; (3) the accounts were safely protected and insured
by an agency of the federal government; thus they were not speculative
in character; and (4) the assets had been and were being used for Por-
ter's support and maintenance.55 The Court reversed the court of appeals
and upheld the lower court's judgment that the funds, as used, remained
protected under section 3101 (a).
Analysis of the Opinion
The Porter decision is the latest step in the gradual growth of the law
relating to exemption of veterans' benefits. It had formerly been decided
that permanently invested veterans' benefits lost their exempt status.5"
That phrase, "permanent investment," was clearly defined in Trotter v.
Tennessee, where it was said to describe payments which had been con-
50. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Porter, 185 F. Supp. 302, 303-05 (D.D.C. 1960).
51. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Porter, 296 F.2d 389, 391-92 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
52. Ibid.
53. Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159 (1962).
54. Id. at 161-62.
55. Ibid.
56. Safekeeping, as opposed to permanently investing the funds, does not deprive veterans'
benefits of their immunity. Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245 (1937).
[Vol. 14:3
EXEMPTION OF VETERANS' BENEFITS
verted into property, or which had been used to finance business or specu-
lative ventures." This criterion was used in Porter. Since the accounts
were not "time deposits at interest" and "were not of a speculative char-
acter," no conversion into property existed. 8 Further, from the use
of the funds, the Court concluded that they amounted "only [to] funds
presently available to meet the petitioner's need."59
According to the majority decision, protection extends to payments
deposited in a normal mode of safekeeping, if the
benefit funds, regardless of technicalities of tide and other for-
malities, are readily available as needed for support and maintenance,
actually retain the qualities of moneys, and have not been converted into
permanent investments.60
The determination of the exemption issue, therefore, requires a close scru-
tiny of each particular method of safekeeping.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion,0" advocated a more liberal
approach: liquidity. He pointed out that, although stocks and bonds, for
example, may be hard to fractionalize, such assets may well be as liquid
as checking or savings accounts. He would have section 3101 (a) pro-
tect transmuted payments if they remain "in a form in which they are
usable, if need be, 'for the maintenance and support of the veteran."' 62
Mr. Justice Douglas' view allows the use of funds in a business ac-
tivity, but without the normal business risk. It disregards the traditional
law of safekeeping; it allows the conversion of the benefits into property
and ignores the purpose for which the payments are used. However,
the assets must remain readily available should the veteran need them for
his sustenance and maintenance.
In contrast, the majority rule in Porter protects veterans' benefits
which are used to provide for a veteran's support, not his speculative enter-
prises. Further, it does not permit the funds to deviate from their original
character as unused benefit payments, either kept on hand or temporarily
deposited for safekeeping. The point of difference, then, lies in whether
the benefits must closely adhere to their original character as "payments
made to, or on account of, a beneficiary."
57. 290 U.S. 354, 356-57 (1933). See also Carrier v. Bryant, 306 U.S. 545 (1939) (appli-
cation of permanent investment rule to non-taxation situation).
58. Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159, 162 (1962).
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159, 162 (1962) (separate opinion).
62. Id. at 164.
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Effect of the Porter Decision On:
Exempt Investments
Prior to the Porter case, confusion existed in regard to investments.
For example, in In re Bowen 3 the Ohio Supreme Court held that upon
investment benefit funds lose their protection. Reliance was placed upon
the use of the term "investment"64 in Lawrence v. Shaw,65 a case in which
the Supreme Court decided that funds deposited for safekeeping in a check-
ing account were not so invested as to have lost their federal protection.
The language upon which the Ohio court relied had reference to
the unprotected permanent investment described in the Trotter case, 6
i.e., the conversion of veterans' allowances into property.6" Because of this
misinterpretation of federal exemption law, the Ohio Supreme Court
held that deposits in a savings account were available to creditors.
By virtue of the Porter case, such an interpretation is no longer possible.
This decision reiterates the law of the Trotter case and sets forth a for-
mula to determine what types of deposits are protected.6" Now, invest-
ment, per se, does not deprive veterans' benefits of protection under sec-
tion 3101 (a).
Exempt Funds Which Earn Interest
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,69 following the Ohio
Court in Bowen," recently decided that invested funds are necessarily un-
protected by section 3101 (a). Further, the Massachusetts case defined
investment to mean the "placing of capital or laying out money in a
way intended to secure income or profit from its employment." 1 Thus,
under this view when benefit funds earn interest, they can no longer be
protected by the federal act.
Clearly, the decision in the Porter case overrules this theory. A con-
sideration of many other factors besides interest is now required. The
degree of protection afforded the funds, the community's methods of safe-
keeping, and the availability of the transmuted benefits to satisfy the
support and maintenance of the veteran all may outweigh the mere
accumulation of interest in a determination of whether a given asset is
63. 141 Ohio St. 602, 49 N.E.2d 753 (1943).
64. In re Bowen, 141 Ohio St. 602, 607, 49 N.E.2d 753, 755 (1943).
65. 300 U.S. 245 (1937).
66. Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 (1933).
67. Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 245, 250 (1937).
68. Porter v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159, 161-62 (1962).
69. Hale v. Gravallese, 340 Mass. 722, 166 N.E.2d 557 (1960).
70. In re Bowen, 141 Ohio St. 602, 49 N.E.2d 753 (1943).
71. Hale v. Gravallese, 340 Mass. 722, 723, 166 N.E.2d 557, 558 (1960).
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protected by section 3101 (a). Interest is only one of many elements
showing the true character of an investment.
Characterization Through the Use of Statutes
The Ohio solution of the savings account problem again illustrates
a probable effect of Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. In Bowen the Ohio
court bolstered its findings by relying upon what is now Ohio Revised
Code section 2109.37, a provision listing permissible investments for
fiduciaries. 3 Since savings accounts are included in this list as proper
"investments," the court concluded that funds deposited in such accounts
must be investments. Under the misconception that all investments are
unprotected, the Ohio court then ruled that such deposits could be sub-
jected to creditors' daims.
It should be noted that characterization for one purpose is not neces-
sarily proper for another. Further, the Supreme Court, in the Porter
case, reversed the appellate court which had relied upon a statutory char-
acterization.7" Being an owner of a deposit in a federal building and loan
association and thus considered a voting member of that institution was not
enough, in the Porter decision, to support a conclusion that the funds,
as used, were permanently invested. The Supreme Court required an
investigation which did not stop with technicalities of title or other simi-
lar formalities. "
Therefore, since an individual assessment of the funds' actual avail-
ability and use is required, local or federal statutory characterization is of
minor importance in determining whether assets are protected by section
3101 (a).
Protected Usage of Veterans' Benefits
Since the practices and procedures of federal savings and loan institu-
tions differ, the Supreme Court considered the funds in their actual
setting. The place of employment is now both a proper and a necessary
subject of inquiry." This will change at least the approach of the
Massachusetts' court, which, in Hale v. Gravallese, held benefit payments
deposited in a savings bank to be unprotected by section 3101 (a) with-
out discussing the nature of the institution or its policies on withdrawal
72. Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159, 161-62 (1962).
73. In re Bowen, 141 Ohio St. 602, 608, 49 N.E.2d 753, 756 (1943).
74. Ibid.
75. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 296 F.2d 389, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
76. Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159, 161-62 (1962).
77. Ibid.
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of funds.78  In the future, the technical form of the funds' employment
will not necessarily be indicative of the absence of federal protection.79
CONCLUSION
Protection of Veterans' Allowances
The Supreme Court in Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. has pene-
trated beyond the technical considerations that so often decided the issue
of protection for veterans' benefits. It has upheld the basic purpose and
intent of the Congress by holding that permanently invested funds are
not protected by section 3101 (a). Investments remain protected when
the funds are merely kept in a normal place of safekeeping, if they are
funds "presently available" to meet the beneficiaries' needs.8"
This interpretation of existing legal principles seems reasonable in
light of the variety of common methods for safekeeping and in light of
the protection already afforded to benefit funds. It is a solution half-
way between the exemption of veterans' benefits in the form of cash or
checking account credits and the vulnerable position of payments which
have been converted into property or launched upon speculative or busi-
ness ventures. The Porter decision, then, allows a needed flexibility in
the area of veterans' benefits and provides a workable rule which deals
equitably with the veteran.
"Creditors" Under Section 3101(a)
No distinction is made by the Veterans' Benefits Act as to "creditors,"
but state and federal courts have created exceptions for spouses, children,
and state welfare departments. Perhaps it may even be asserted that con-
gressional silence in the 1957-1958 revision and recodification of the vet-
erans' laws, as to the claimants who may recover from exempt funds,
constitutes a tacit approval of the status quo."' Since these claimants
derive their rights from a fundamental moral, social, and legal policy,
it will probably be only a matter of time before Congress or the Supreme
Court recognizes their judicially forged right to satisfy their claims from
protected funds.
On the other hand, even though he asserts a bona fide and reasonable
claim, the rights of the innocent supplier of necessities, dealing with the
competent veteran, are unclear.8 His claim for furnishing present sup-
78. Hale v. Gravallese, 340 Mass. 722, 723, 166 N.E.2d 557, 558 (1960).
79. Porter v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159, 162 (1962).
80. Ibid.
81. In re Bemowski's Guardianship, 3 Wis. 2d 133, 142, 88 N.W.2d 22, 27 (1958). Cf.
Chojnacki's Estate No. 1, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 152, 155-57 (Orphans' Ct. 1958).
82. Earl v. Reynolds, 49 Ga. App. 510, 176 S.E. 91 (1934), deals only with past support.
The cases dealing with the state's right to recover seem to indicate that timely application by
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